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Abstract: 
 
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill has recently been reported back from the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee. The Bill seeks to deter, prevent and mitigate the harm caused to individuals through digital communications 
and to provide victims of harmful digital communications with a quick and efficient means of redress. In addition to 
modernising existing legislation and establishing a new civil enforcement regime, the Bill controversially introduces a 
new criminal offence of posting a harmful communication with the intent that the communication causes harm to a victim. 
Surprisingly, the offence differs significantly from comparable legislation abroad where neither a mens rea standard of 
intent is present nor a requirement that a victim must suffer serious emotional distress in order for an offender to be liable. 
This paper critiques the likely application of the offence and ultimately concludes that in light of differing legislation 
abroad and cases which have arisen since the enactment of the Communications Act in the United Kingdom, that the 
mens rea standard should be modified to include subjective recklessness, and the requirement that an intended victim 
must suffer actual harm should be removed. 
 
Key Words: 
Harmful Digital Communications, Cyberbullying, Criminal Offence.  
  
4  
 
 
I Introduction 
 
In recent decades the use of digital technology as a means of communication has grown 
exponentially. As the world becomes increasingly globalised, cyberspace is becoming 
populated by more and more people each day. Modern society has arrived at a point where 
individuals are heavily reliant on their phones, e-mails, social media accounts and other 
forms of internet communication in a formerly unprecedented manner.  
 
While the growing prevalence of such technologies has allowed for far greater 
convenience, cyberspace has arguably become a “vast unsupervised public playground”.1 
Reported incidents of abuse and harassment through technological means has led to an 
overwhelmingly large number of victims being harassed, causing a multitude of harms such 
as: fear, humiliation, depression, and in the worst of cases, self-harm and suicide.  
 
The current Government has rightfully acknowledged that like overseas jurisdictions 
seeking to address this issue, New Zealand must extend the law to better protect individuals 
from such harms. However, although the Harmful Digital Communications Bill seeks to 
modernise New Zealand’s outdated legislation and to introduce a criminal offence 
specifically targeted at those who use cyberspace as a forum for abuse, the Bill, particularly 
the new offence of intentionally causing harm, appears to fall well short of being an 
adequate solution to the problem of remedying the harms caused by harmful digital 
communications. 
 
An examination of the Bill’s current format as reported by the Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee and a comparative analysis with cyberbullying laws in force in other 
jurisdictions highlight the deficiencies in the legislation. Particularly, the requirements that 
a defendant must have intended to cause harm to a victim, and that a victim must have 
suffered harm in order for an offender to be criminally liable, differ significantly from 
comparable legislation abroad, suggesting that the Bill must be strengthened prior to its 
eventual enactment if New Zealand is to truly make inroads into the ongoing problem of 
abuse through digital communication. 
  
  
1  Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyberbullying Respectful and Responsible 
Relationships: There’s No App for That (Nova Scotia, 29 February 2012) at 12. 
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II The Key Features of New Zealand’s Proposed Legislation 
 
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill was initially drafted with the aim of 
mitigating the harm caused to individuals through digital communication.2 Upon reflection, 
the Justice and Electoral Select Committee expanded the purpose of the Bill to include 
deterrence and prevention of harm inflicted through digital means.3 Secondly, the Bill seeks 
to provide victims of harm caused by digital communication with a quick and efficient 
means of redress.4 In order to achieve these objectives, the Bill proposes the introduction 
of: a civil enforcement regime, a criminal offence specifically targeted at the most serious 
harmful communications, and amendments to existing legislation to ensure their effective 
application to digital communications.5 
A The Proposed Civil Enforcement Regime 
1 The Approved Agency 
The Law Commission has rightfully acknowledged that the availability of timely, 
effective relief is equally as important as changing the law itself.6 Further, existing web-
based reporting systems are supposedly unable to adequately provide relief to victims in 
every instance of abuse.7 Accordingly, the Bill seeks to introduce an approved agency that 
would operate in a civil jurisdiction with the ability to investigate complaints and attempt 
to resolve disputes pertaining to digital communication by means of negotiation, mediation 
and persuasion.8 The Tribunal would also exist to: establish relationships with service 
providers, content hosts and agencies; 9 to educate and advise on policies relating to safe 
online behaviour and conduct;10 and any other functions the Tribunal would be instructed 
to exercise through Order in Council.11 The Tribunal would also have the ability to lodge 
  
2  Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (168-1) (explanatory note). 
3  cl 3. 
4  cl 3. 
5  Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The adequacy of the current sanctions and 
remedies (NZLC 2012) at 11. 
6  At 47(d). 
7  At 58. 
8  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cls 8(1)(b), 8(1)(c). 
9  cl 8(1)(d). 
10  cl 8(1)(e). 
11  cl 8(1)(f). 
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complaints with online content hosts on behalf of those alleging they have been harmed 
and provide advice and assistance to the complainant.12  
 
In exercising the prescribed functions, the Tribunal is to be guided by a set of principles 
stipulating the types of digital communications that are unacceptable. Among the principles 
are criteria stipulating that a digital communication shall not: disclose sensitive personal 
information, threaten or intimidate, be grossly offensive from the victim’s point of view, 
be used as a means of harassment, or be used to either incite or encourage a person to harm 
themselves.13  
2 Orders Imposed by the District Court 
While the Bill does not permit the Approved Agency to remove allegedly harmful 
digital communications, victims and their representatives are given the ability to apply to 
the District Court in an attempt to have such material removed. Either the victim, one of 
their guardians, a school principal, or a member of the Police is able to apply for an order 
to have content removed.14 In determining whether an order shall be granted, and what 
form the order will take, the Court must have regard to: the content of the communication; 
the communicator’s purpose, the communication’s context and subject matter, the extent 
to which (if any) the communication has spread beyond the initial intended audience, the 
age and vulnerability of the affected person, the truth or falsity of the statement, whether 
the communication is in the public interest, the conduct of both the defendant and the 
affected person, and the technical and operational practicalities of an order.15 If satisfied 
that an order would be appropriate and not contrary to any of the rights and freedoms 
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act 1990,16 the Court may make one or more orders requiring 
the defendant to do any of the following: takedown or disable the material posted, cease 
the conduct concerned (if any), refrain from encouraging other people to engage in similar 
communications towards the victim, correct the publication, give a right of reply to the 
victim, or make an apology.17 Interim orders can also be granted in the same manner, which 
expire upon the determination of the primary application.18 
 
 
  
12  cl 20. 
13  cl 6(1). 
14  cl 10. 
15  cl 17(4). 
16  cl 17(5). 
17  cl 17(1). 
18  cl 16(3). 
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B Amendments to Existing Legislation 
 
The Bill seeks to both modernise and strengthen four existing statutes to ensure their 
effective application to digital communications. Firstly, the Crimes Act 1961 currently 
sanctions any person who incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit suicide if 
that person commits, or attempts to commit suicide as a consequence.19 Further, the aiding 
or abetting of any person in the commission of suicide is also an offence.20 The Bill seeks 
to expand the provisions relating to the incitement or counsel of suicide by making it an 
offence to do so irrespective of whether or not the victim actually attempts to commit 
suicide in consequence of the defendant’s conduct. A person who commits such an offence 
is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.21 
 
Secondly, the Harassment Act 1997 is to be amended in multiple ways. The meaning 
of harassment is to be expanded to include situations where a person engages in a pattern 
of behaviour directed against another which is a continuing act carried out over any period 
(unlike the current two separate occasions within a period of 12 months requirement). 
Additionally, the definition of a continuing act is to be expanded to include circumstances 
where a specified act is done in isolation, however continues to have effect over a 
protracted period.22 In the context of digital communication, both amendments are to have 
the effect of ensuring that material being posted on electronic media which remains there 
for an extended period of time, constitutes harassment.23 Further, the definition of 
“specified act” is to be expanded to include situations where a person is contacted through 
electronic communication, and to circumstances where offensive material is communicated 
and is likely to be seen by the allegedly harassed person.24 Additionally, in relation to 
restraining orders issued under the Act, it is to become a condition of every order in relation 
to a continuing act, that the respondent take reasonable steps to prevent the specified act 
from occurring.25 With respect to harmful digital communication, this amendment is 
intended to have the effect of requiring the defendant to remove content posted on the 
internet. However, the section acknowledges that the defendant may not be able to remove 
  
19  Crimes Act 1961, s 179(a). 
20  s 179(b). 
21  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cl 24. 
22  A specified act for the purposes of the Harassment Act is an act that causes a reasonable person to 
fear for his or her safety.  
23  cl 26(4). 
24  cl 27. 
25  cl 28.  
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the content from every individual forum in which it is posted, thus the “reasonable steps” 
limitation has been included.26 
 
Thirdly, the Human Rights Act is to be modernised in a series of ways. The current 
“racial disharmony” discrimination provision that makes it unlawful to publish or broadcast 
by means of radio or television, words that distribute written matter which are threatening, 
abusive or insulting, is to be expanded to include broadcasting through other forms of 
electronic communication. Moreover, the sexual and racial harassment provisions are to be 
expanded to include “participation in fora for the exchange of ideas or information”. 
 
Finally, the Privacy Act is to be amended in two ways. The Act currently contains 
twelve principles pertaining to agencies’ ability to collect personal information.27 The tenth 
principle states that an agency holding personal information obtained in connection with a 
particular purpose should not be used for another, unless the agency reasonably believes 
that, among other criteria, the source of the information is a publicly available 
publication.28 Further, the eleventh principle relates to limitations on disclosures of 
information and states that disclosure of information can occur where the source of the 
information is a publicly available publication. The Bill proposes to qualify both principles 
by requiring that in the circumstances of a particular case, it would not be unfair or 
unreasonable to either use or disclose the information.29 These amendments are considered 
necessary as the Law Commission believes they would be useful in addressing online 
communication harms which significantly impact on a person’s privacy.30 The Act also 
currently states that the privacy principles are inapplicable in respect of the collection of 
personal information by an agency that is an individual, or personal information that is held 
by an agency that is an individual, where the information is collected or held solely for the 
purpose of, or in connection with, the individual’s personal, family or household affairs.31 
The Bill seeks to qualify the domestic affairs requirement by ensuring that it ceases to apply 
once the personal information’s collection, disclosure or use would be highly offensive to 
an ordinary reasonable person.32 Despite being considered a “crucial exception” by some 
commentators,33 the Law Commission acknowledges that the exception currently allows 
  
26  Law Commission, above n 5, at 4.114. 
27  Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
28  s 6.  
29  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cls 36(1), 36(2). 
30  Law Commission, above n 5, at 4.125. 
31  Privacy Act 1993, s 56. 
32  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cl 35. 
33  Gehan Gunasekara and Alan Toy “MySpace” or “Public Space” [2008] 23 NZULR 191 at 213. 
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intimate pictures taken during a domestic relationship may be exempt from the Privacy Act 
principles if published upon the breakdown of the relationship.34 Accordingly, this 
amendment is considered pivotal in relation to combatting cyber abuse. 
C The Introduction of Criminal Offences 
 
The Bill proposes the introduction of two criminal offences. Firstly, if, in the absence 
of reasonable excuse, a person fails to comply with an requiring that person to: take down 
material, correct a publication, give a right of reply, or issue an apology, then that person 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
six months, or a fine of up to $5,000.35 In the case of a body corporate, the maximum fine 
is $20,000.36 
 
Secondly, the Bill seeks to create a more punitive criminal offence specifically tailored 
towards the most serious offending. If a person: posts a digital communication with the 
intent of causing harm to a victim,37 the posting of the communication would cause harm 
to an ordinary person in the victim’s position,38 and the communication does in fact cause 
harm to the victim,39 then that person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.40 In order for a person to be considered 
a victim, they must be the target of a posted digital communication.41 Additionally, in 
assessing whether or not the communication would cause harm to a victim, the may take 
into account any factors it considers relevant, including: the extremity of the language used, 
the age and characteristics of the victim, whether the communication was anonymous or 
the author is identified, whether the communication was repeated, the extent of circulation, 
whether the communication is true or false, and the context in which the communication 
appeared.42 
 
 
  
34  Law Commission, above n 5, at 4.123. 
35  cls 18(1), 18(2)(a). 
36  cl 18(2)(b). 
37  cl 19(1)(a). 
38  cl 19(1)(b). 
39  cl 19(1)(c). 
40  cl 19(3). 
41  cl 19(4). 
42  cl 19(2). 
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III Critique of the Proposed Criminal Offence of Intentionally Harming a 
Victim 
 
While the Harmful Digital Communications Bill seeks to bring New Zealand into line 
with other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, 
all of which have recently enacted legislation to combat cyber-bullying, there are numerous 
significant points of difference in New Zealand’s proposed legislation. Additionally, the 
Bill’s purpose, following Select Committee consideration, now includes deterrence in 
addition to prevention and mitigation of harm, and providing victims with a quick and 
efficient means of redress.43 In light of both the initial provisions, and the changes made 
by the Justice and Electoral Select Committee, it is seriously questionable whether the 
current clauses in the Bill reconcile with the Bill’s ultimate purposes.  
 
Specifically, the introduction of a new criminal offence of causing harm by posting a 
digital communication requires detailed scrutiny in assessing whether the Bill will, in 
actuality, deter and mitigate harm caused by posting harmful material. Particularly, there 
are two requirements of the offence that require detailed assessment. Firstly, whether the 
condition that a digital communication must be posted with the intent of causing harm 
should exist, is highly contentious for a multitude of reasons.44 Secondly, it is difficult to 
reconcile the requirement that posting a communication must actually cause harm to the 
victim, with the newly included purpose of deterrence.45  
A The Purpose of the Criminal Offence 
 
While the parliamentary debates, the Select Committee report, and other official 
materials are silent as to the overall purpose of the criminal offence, it is implicit from the 
legislation that the offence exists in order to punish misusers of digital communication 
networks, vindicate the wrong that has been done, and deter future offending. All of the 
unique civil law remedies such as takedown orders, apologies, and corrections, are 
concerned with putting right the wrong that has been caused to the victim.  Furthermore, 
numerous academics submit that civil law is primarily considered to be compensatory in 
nature, and is not ordinarily viewed as a means of deterrence.46 Conversely, one of the 
  
43  cl 3.  
44  cl 19(1)(a). 
45  cl 3. 
46  B Atkin, G McLay, and B Hodge Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 
4. 
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primary aims of criminal law is to deter future offending,47 and given the structure of the 
proposed legislation, the offence of intentionally harming a victim appears to be no 
exception. 
 
B Should there be a requirement that a victim must have suffered actual harm in order 
for an offender to be liable under the new criminal offence? 
 
As the Bill is currently drafted, two requirements are necessary to be satisfied in 
addition to the defendant needing to have intended to cause harm. Firstly, the posting of a 
communication must cause harm to an ordinary person in the victim’s position.48 Secondly, 
the posting of the communication must actually cause harm to the victim.49 The 
combination of both an objective and a subjective element with respect to a victim needing 
to have been harmed is unique when contrasted with legislation abroad. Furthermore, a 
person is considered to have been harmed only if they have suffered “serious emotional 
distress”.50 While commentary as to how “serious emotional distress” will be interpreted 
is merely speculation at present, and uncertainty surrounds whether this threshold will 
differ from the Law Commission’s proposed standard of “significant emotional distress”,51 
a requirement that a person must have suffered harm, irrespective of how harm is defined, 
seriously questions the achievability of deterrence. 
 
In the event that a victim does not actually suffer “serious emotional distress”, it is 
possible that a person posting a communication with harmful intent may be criminally 
liable under the law of attempts. In New Zealand, if a person, with intent to commit an 
offence, does an act for the purpose of accomplishing his object, that person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit the offence intended, irrespective of whether, in the circumstances, it 
was possible to commit the offence or not.52 The offence in question is uniquely structured, 
however, the likely application of this provision to the offence, therefore, is that if a person 
posts a communication with the purpose of harming someone, they will be liable for an 
attempt even if a person is not offended by the content, despite potentially being considered 
offensive objectively. Those successfully convicted for attempts are liable to half the 
  
47  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2002) 
at 1.2.2. 
48  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cl 19(1)(b). 
49  cl 19(1)(c). 
50  cl 4. 
51  Law Commission, above n 5, at 20. 
52  Crimes Act 1961, s 72(1). 
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maximum punishment they would have been liable for had they successfully committed 
the offence.53 Therefore, a person could potentially be imprisoned for up to 12 months for 
attempting to harm someone by posting a digital communication.54 However, if attempts 
are not readily prosecuted under this offence, or if the mens rea standard is modified to 
include recklessness as is later suggested, the necessity of a harm requirement becomes 
contentious. 
1 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
 
Notably, like the requirement of intent, actual harm is not a requirement in the United 
Kingdom. The equivalent legislation is a purely objective assessment as to whether a 
communication is either grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing 
character.55 The assessment is clearly much easier to satisfy than that in New Zealand as 
the objective element of our proposed legislation requires that a reasonable person in the 
victim’s position must have been caused serious emotional distress.56 Conversely, the 
United Kingdom legislation does not place any consideration on whether there is a victim, 
let alone whether that victim has been harmed.  The rationale behind the inclusion of the 
objective element in New Zealand is most probably to ensure that trivial or unmeritorious 
complaints are not made by hyper-sensitive people regarding content that would ordinarily 
not be considered emotionally distressful, and that we are not policing victimless crimes.  
 
However, the inclusion of the objective element casts doubt on the necessity of having 
a requirement that a person actually be harmed by a communication. The objective element 
ensures that the offence will only apply to situations where reasonable people would suffer 
harm. Therefore, as the Bill currently reads, even if harm is likely to result through an 
objective assessment, offenders will be immune from liability if the person they intended 
to harm, does not in fact suffer serious emotional distress. The removal of the subjective 
requirement would incentivise people to not post offensive content, as it would ensure that 
offenders do not post harmful content even in situations where there may be a particularly 
robust victim who is not harmed by the communication. Further, the “serious emotional 
distress” threshold is also likely to fail to account for victims who may suffer tangible 
economic harm. The removal of the subjective requirement would better achieve the 
purpose of deterrence in such cases, as it would ensure people refrain from posting 
  
53  s 311. 
54  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cl 19(3) 
55  Communications Act 2003 (UK), s 127. 
56  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cls 19, 4. 
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offensive content, even where they suspect the intended victim might not suffer serious 
emotional distress or perhaps a lesser of different form of harm.  
 
Furthermore, the offence does also not account for situations where a person has posted 
something which is clearly objectionable by reasonable standards, however potentially may 
not have been viewed by the intended victim/s. Theoretically, reasonable internet users 
could view a communication targeted at someone else and be fully appreciative that the 
content will likely harm the intended target, but because the intended victim/s have not 
seen the communication yet, nor suffered the serious emotional distress that is likely to 
ensue, the offender is not criminally responsible. If the purpose of the Bill is to not only 
deter, but mitigate and prevent harm, then it would be far more effective if the actual harm 
requirement were removed as this would incentivise users to not post offensive content in 
the first instance. Rather, for a person to be criminally liable at present, the communication 
must remain broadcasted up until the time an intended victim is harmed by it. It is arguable 
that the law will be sending the message that it is okay to post offensive material provided 
that the person to whom it was intended to harm, does not become aware of it. A much 
more satisfactory result would be to proactively deter harmful content being posted in the 
first instance by removing the subjective element which requires that the victim be harmed, 
as this would incentivise internet users to refrain from posting offensive content, as they 
would be aware that the communication need only be harmful to a reasonable person in the 
victim’s position to be liable, not that the victim must actually suffer harm. This incentive 
would also prevent people suffering the harm of seeing content offensive to them posted 
on a public forum in the first instance. 
2 Does the actual harm requirement assist to promote the wider purposes of the Bill? 
 
One of the most noteworthy revisions of the Bill at Select Committee stage was the 
inclusion of the purpose of deterring harm being caused to individuals through digital 
communication. The significant amendment made to the criminal offence, namely, the 
increase of the maximum penalty from either a fine of $2,000 or three months 
imprisonment to a period of two years imprisonment, strongly accords with this view. 
However, despite the obvious apparent deterrent effect of potentially being subject to a 
much longer period of imprisonment, the retention of the actual harm requirement 
significantly questions the true achievability of deterrence. 
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One useful articulation of the operation of deterrence in the criminal law suggests that 
the actual harm requirement will hinder the Bill’s deterrent effect. Deterrence in a criminal 
law context is broadly defined as a means of discouraging members of society from 
committing criminal acts out of fear of punishment.57 A deterrent is considered to be 
anything which exerts a preventative force towards crime.58 While deterrence is considered 
to be one of the primary rationales behind the imposition of criminal sanctions, significant 
doubts have been cast over the assertion that the possibility of a criminal sentence acts as 
a strong disincentive for potential criminals to engage in illegal conduct.59 It has been 
suggested that for a criminal sanction to act as an effective deterrent there are three criterion 
that must be satisfied: first, potential offenders must directly or indirectly know what 
actions are criminalised and what conditions will excuse them, second, offenders must 
bring such understanding to bear on their conduct choices at the moment of making their 
choices, thirdly, the perception of their choices must be such that they are likely to choose 
compliance with the law rather than the commission of the criminal offence.60 
 
The second requirement of the aforementioned test, namely, that the offender must 
bring an understanding of what is criminalised to bear on their conduct when making 
choices, is highly unlikely to be satisfied in relation to the offence in question.61 If a person 
posts a communication not only does it need to be considered harmful objectively, but 
someone must also actually be harmed. This requirement would have the effect that if a 
post were objectionably offensive, irrespective of how extremely harmful it may be, if a 
victim does not suffer serious emotional distress, the offender will be immune from 
liability. Essentially, therefore, if an internet user knew that something would be considered 
harmful by objectionable standards, but was aware there was some possibility that the post 
may not harm anyone, then the potential imposition of a criminal sanction may not effective 
deter those offenders. This problem is heavily exacerbated by the Bill’s definition of 
“victim,” which is defined as “the individual who is the target of a posted digital 
communication”.62 Therefore, for a person to be liable, the person harmed must be the 
  
57  Legal Dictionary by Farlex “Deterrence” <www.legal-dictionary.com>. 
58  Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 Dick. L. Rev. 1 (1983-
1984) at 1. 
59  Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation” (2004) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 173 at 173. 
60  At 175. 
61  Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 Dick. L. Rev. 1 (1983-
1984) at 1. 
62  Harmful Digital Communications Bill, cl 19(4). 
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specific individual who the offender actually wanted to harm, which has the potential to 
lead to some alarming results. 
 
For example, if a person posted an offensive publication such as naked picture of a 
toddler, a mentally disabled person, or someone otherwise incapable of understanding the 
distress or harm that may result because of such a post, and that person was the offender’s 
target, the offender would not be liable. It is likely that the parents, guardians, or other 
people close to such victims would suffer serious emotional distress as a result of such 
posts, but if they are not the intended targets, then the offender will not be liable. 
Alarmingly, the Bill actually permits such people to make an application for a take down 
order,63 which impliedly suggests that they may be harmed by such content, yet the 
offender will not be liable unless it can be proven that they intended to harm those people. 
The need to prove intent to harm such individuals would not be necessary if the requirement 
of actual harm was removed, as offenders would then only be required post material which 
would be reasonably capable of causing serious emotional distress to be subjected to 
criminal liability. Such a result would accord much better with the Bill’s purposes as 
potential offenders would then be discouraged from posting offensive material, even if they 
considered that the specific person they intended to harm, may not suffer serious emotional 
distress. It would greatly overcome the evidential difficulties of proving intent and go a 
long way towards achieving not only the deterrence, but also the mitigation and prevention 
of harm in this context. 
C Should there be a requirement that the defendant must have intended to cause harm 
to be liable under the new criminal offence? 
1 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
 
In contrast to New Zealand, many other common law countries criminalise harmful 
digital communications through statute in the absence of any proven intent by the 
defendant. In the United Kingdom it is a criminal offence to improperly use a 
communications network.64 Specifically, if a person sends (or causes to be sent) by means 
of a public electronic communications network, a message or other matter that is grossly 
offensive or of an indecent or menacing character, that person is guilty of an offence and 
is liable upon summary conviction to either a term of imprisonment for a maximum period 
  
63  cl 10. 
64  Communication Act 2003 (UK), s 127. 
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of six months,65 or a fine not exceeding £5,000.66 The United Kingdom equivalent focuses 
strictly on the nature and content of the communication, and does not, according to the 
statute, require the defendant to have desired a person to be harmed. Within the first eight 
years of enactment the provision led to more than 5,316 successful prosecutions,67 and now 
appears to be the most frequently utilised provision to initiate criminal proceedings against 
misusers of networks in the United Kingdom.68 Accordingly, in light of a number of 
controversial breaches of the provision, culminating in a case involving tweets criticising 
airport delays for the purpose of provoking humour,69 judicial opinion has been divided 
over the last decade on whether an intent requirement should exist, despite the absence of 
any such requirement in the Communications Act.  
 
The leading judgment on this issue saw the House of Lords split as to whether an intent 
requirement should exist in the Communications Act. In a case involving a man who 
continuously left voice messages to his local MP regarding his dissatisfaction with 
“Wogis”, “Pakis” and “Niggers” in his electorate, the House of Lords accepted the 
submission of the Director of Public Prosecutions that the defendant must either intend his 
or her words to be grossly offensive or be aware that they may be taken to be so.70 Their 
Lordships adopted the well-known dicta of Lord Reid which states that in the absence of 
an express mens rea requirement, there is a presumption that Parliament’s intention is not 
to criminalise people free of blameworthiness.71 Further, that in the context of grossly 
offensive content being sent via a communications network, Parliament cannot have 
intended to subject those who are unaware that the language they are using is grossly 
offensive, to criminal liability.72 It is possible that the New Zealand legislature has included 
an intent requirement to prevent any ambiguity surrounding what the relevant mens rea 
standard is and avoid the inevitability of a similar case arising domestically where a court 
may “read-in” the need for a defendant to have intended to cause harm. 
 
  
65  s 127(3). 
66  Criminal Justice Act 1982 (UK), s 37(2). 
67  (14 June 2010) Column 316W Crispin Blunt MP (UK); Open Rights Group “Communications Act 
2003/Section 127” <www.wiki.openrightsgroup.org>. 
68  The IT Law Community “Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?” (9 
October 2012) <www.scl.org>. 
69  Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (QB). 
70  Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 (19 July 2006) at 11. 
71  Sweet v Parsley (UK) [1970] AC 132 at 148. 
72  Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins, above n 70, at 11. 
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However, with the exception of Lord Brown, the majority of the House of Lords in 
Collins did not appear to take account of numerous other provisions in United Kingdom 
statues that expressly require intent in a cyber-abuse context. Almost all of the other cyber-
abuse offences in the United Kingdom expressly require intent or knowledge on part of the 
offender. It is, therefore, also highly likely that the exclusion of a mens rea standard from 
the Communications Act was not a parliamentary oversight, and is owing to the fact that 
such a requirement was deemed to be undesirable.  
 
Statutes indicative of the view that the United Kingdom legislature ordinarily includes 
an intent requirement in the digital communication context include the Malicious 
Communications Act which criminalises electronic communications of an indecent or 
grossly offensive nature where the defendant had the purpose of intending to cause distress 
or anxiety to the recipient or any other person to whom the matter was communicated to.73 
Additionally, the Protection from Harassment Act, albeit assessed objectively, requires that 
the defendant knows or ought to know that the course of conduct they are engaging in 
amounts to harassment of another.74 Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, the less 
culpable improper use of a network offence in the Communications Act of causing 
annoyance, inconvenience or anxiety to another, expressly requires that to have been the 
defendant’s purpose.75  
 
The absence of an intent requirement in the Communications Act would also accord 
with many recent prosecutions such as a man jailed for creating a Facebook event to start 
riots in his locale,76 and a person being arrested after setting up a webpage praising a murder 
suspect.77 In neither case were the defendants’ motives to harm a specific person through 
the communications themselves, yet people understandably took serious offence to both 
publications. The existence of an intent requirement would have likely ensured that both 
individuals in these cases were not subject to prosecution. Instances of this kind strongly 
suggest that an intent requirement should be absent from the New Zealand legislation as 
the alternative outcome would be that grossly offensive material of this kind would be 
permissible and the individuals posting such material would be free from any form of 
  
73  Malicious Communications Act 1998 (UK), s 1(1). 
74  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK), s 1. 
75  Communications Act (UK), s 127(2). 
76  BBC News “Facebook riot invitation lands Bangor man, 21, in jail” (23 August 2011) 
<www.bbc.co.uk>. 
77  Stephen Wright, Liz Hull et al. “Detectives arrest man, 22, over ‘offensive’ Facebook page set up 
following deaths of shot policewomen” Mail Online (20 September 2012) <www.dailymail.co.uk>. 
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criminal prosecution or punishment whatsoever except perhaps the possibility of being 
subject to an order requiring them to apologise to those who have been harmed, or to 
remove the material.78 Such a result would seriously question the achievability of both the 
prevention and deterrence of harm. 
 
In Victoria, Australia, the equivalent provision sanctions the use of a carriage service 
(including mobile phones and the internet)79 in circumstances where reasonable persons 
would consider that use to be menacing, harassing, or offensive. If convicted, a person 
faces imprisonment for a period of up to three years.80 The offence carries a maximum term 
of imprisonment penalty that is longer than both the United Kingdom’s six months and 
New Zealand’s two years, yet there is no requirement that the defendant must have intended 
to cause harm. Subjecting a person to a potential period of imprisonment for a longer period 
than both New Zealand and the United Kingdom implies the offence carries greater 
culpability in Victoria, and the exclusion of an express intent requirement in such 
circumstances casts further doubt on whether one is necessary or indeed desirable in New 
Zealand. 
 
Conversely, however, numerous jurisdictions in the United States require the defendant 
to have intended to harm another person. The relevant legislation in both Kentucky and 
Alabama criminalises harassing communications only if the defendant communicates with 
the intent of intimidation, harassment or annoyance.81 However, both states are part of the 
relatively small minority of jurisdictions in the United States who have moved to either 
create cyberbullying laws or modernise existing laws to ensure their application to harmful 
digital communications.82 It would be premature to assume that there will be unanimity in 
this approach as other states move to criminalise cyberbullying. Therefore, it is arguable 
New Zealand should instead replicate the provisions of our fellow Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and dispense with the intent requirement prior to the Bill’s eventual enactment 
to achieve uniformity with both Australia and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
  
78  cl 17(1)(f). 
79  Law Commission, above n 5, at 4.73. 
80  Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), s 474.17. 
81  KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. §525.080; ALA. CODE Sec.13A-11-8(b). 
82  National Conference of State Legislatures “Cyberbullying and the states” (9 July 2010) 
<www.ncsl.org>. 
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2 Does the intent requirement assist to promote the wider purposes of the Bill? 
 
Considering the aforementioned test of an effective deterrent in light of the intent 
requirement further questions whether the offence will effectively deter harmful digital 
communications. It has been submitted that:83 first, potential offenders must directly or 
indirectly know what actions are criminalised and what conditions will excuse them, 
second, offenders must bring such understanding to bear on their conduct choices at the 
moment of making their choices, thirdly, the perception of their choices must be such that 
they are likely to choose compliance with the law rather than the commission of the 
criminal offence. In relation to the third criterion, given that the maximum term of 
imprisonment has been extended to two years, a rational cost-benefit analysis would 
suggest that it is likely that non-compliance with the law is not at issue. Rational people 
are incredibly unlikely to value making harmful posts with intent to cause harm to such an 
extent that they are willing to be subjected to imprisonment for two years.84 However, 
whether the first and second criterion are satisfied in relation to the proposed offence is 
highly questionable. 
 
Applying the first criterion, namely, that offenders know what actions are criminalised 
and what conditions will excuse them, to the provision in question casts doubt over whether 
the offence is going to act an an effective deterrent. As drafted, the offence is not going to 
deter people from posting objectively offensive content, if the communicator does not 
believe it to be so. If a person is oblivious to the fact that what they are posting is offensive, 
then a criminal offence restricting offenders from intentionally posting offensive content is 
not going to stop them. There are numerous recent convictions in the United Kingdom 
where offenders have posted content which is blatantly offensive, yet the offender has been 
unaware that the communication may be harmful. Examples include: the aforementioned 
case involving a Facebook event inviting people to partake in riots where the offender did 
not believe “people would take it seriously”,85 a man posting on Facebook that “all soldiers 
  
83  Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, above n 59, at 175. 
84  Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (6th ed, Pearson, Boston, 2012) at 462. 
85  WalesOnline “Man jailed for four months over Facebook attempt to start riots in Bangor” (23 
August 2011) <www.walesonline.co.uk>. 
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should die and go to hell” which he believed not to be offensive,86 and a famous footballer 
posting homophobic comments on Twitter believing them to be merely “humourous”.87  
 
Furthermore, there is a growing concern in the United Kingdom surrounding the 
posting of sexually explicit content on social media.88 Academics and lawyers have 
submitted that in many “revenge porn” cases it is not clear that the communicator is aware 
of the gross offence that can be taken by the participants in such videos and images, as the 
content is often posted with a view that it will just lead to humiliation.89 This issue is 
exacerbated by cases where the communicator only sends the material to one other person 
who then disseminates it to a wider audience.90 In such cases the original communicator 
may have abstained from sending the material to a wider audience owing to an 
apprehension that those in the video or image might take offence. However, if the second 
communicator of the information does not believe this to be the case, which is likely given 
they may not even know the sexual participants personally, the material may then go viral 
through cyberspace, despite the initial communicator not intending it to do so. Despite 
these concerns however, the United Kingdom has acknowlegded that the existing offence 
under the Communications Act is adequate to deal with such cases and has decided against 
imposing a new offence of posting revenge porn.91 Importantly, the Communications Act 
does not require intent on part of the communicator, unlike New Zealand’s proposed 
offence. Ultimately, therefore, if the intent requirement remains in our legislation, all 
instances where offenders are oblivious to the offensive nature of content are not going to 
be deterred from posting incredibly derogatory material of this kind. 
 
Doubt as to whether the offence will be an effective deterrent is exacerbated by the 
second criterion which requires that the offender brings their understanding of what is 
criminalised on their conduct. This requirement is highly unlikely to be satisfied in the 
context of digital communications in the presence of an intent requirement. Intention 
requires that the person sought to bring about the relevant outcome, or that the defendant 
  
86  BBC News “Azhar Ahmed sentenced over Facebook solider deaths slur” (9 October 2013) 
<www.bbc.com>. 
87  Crown Prosecution Service “DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions” The 
blog of the Crown Prosecution Service (20 September 2013) <www.blogs.cps.gov.uk>. 
88  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications “Social Media and Criminal Offences 
Inquiry” at 8. 
89  At 31. 
90  At 8 and 9. 
91  Question More “UK Parliament shoots down ‘unnecessary’ anti-revenge porn laws” (29 July 2014) 
<www.rt.com>. 
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appreciated that the actus reus of an offence was a virtually certain consequence of their 
actions.92 This requirement does not accord with the motives of a significantly large 
number of people posting harmful digital communications both domestically and abroad.  
 
There are a multitude of reported cases where victims have become depressed, 
humiliated, and even harmed themselves, owing to harmful communications where the 
defendant’s purpose was not to harm or injure the victim, but merely provoke humour, 
embarrassment or to attract attention. A 20 year old was recently convicted in the United 
Kingdom for posting a photograph online of a police officer after drawing two penises on 
him. The post was shared by 1,700 people and caused considerable humiliation to the 
victim, yet the offender only posted the image because of his dissatisfaction with having to 
wait a long time at the police station.93 Furthermore, a teenager was convicted for posting 
sexually depraved comments about a missing 5 year old who eventually died. He merely 
did so to get attention despite being told by numerous people how offensive the comments 
were.94 Additionally, in rather ironic circumstances a famous footballer was racially abused 
on Twitter through being referred to as a “coon” by one of his fans who tweeted solely for 
the purpose of snaring the footballer and getting a reaction from him.95 None of these 
offenders in the United Kingdom intended to harm their respective victoms, and these 
successful convictions strongly suggest that there should not be an intent requirement in 
New Zealand if we are to truly deter offensive communications. 
 
New Zealand has also recently witnessed an abhorrent misuse of social media where 
the offender’s intent has been unclear. In 2012, two males supplied a 16 year old girl with 
alcohol, got her drunk, and sexually violated her with a hammer and a road cone despite 
her reluctance to co-operate.96 The events were photographed and details were later posted 
on Facebook,97 which led to the girl being disowned by her parents and her fleeing of the 
city to avoid public ridicule.98 Alarmingly, the offender conceded to not thinking about the 
  
92  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2002) 
at 4.2.1.  
93  Daily Mail Reporter “Builder ordered to pay policeman £400 after drawing two penises on a picutre 
of him and posting it on Facebook” MailOnline <www.dailymail.co.uk>.  
94  The Guardian “Facebook user avoids jail over April Jones comments” (7 November 2012) 
<www.theguardian.com>. 
95  The Huffington Post “Joshua Cryer, Newcastle Student Who Called Stan Collymore ‘Coon’ In 
Racist Tweet, Spared Jail” <www.huffingtonpost.co.uk>. 
96  R v Broekman [2012] NZCA 213 at [2] and [3]. 
97  At [5]. 
98  At [5]. 
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girl’s pain nor did he appreciate or realise the harm he was doing to her.99 This case is a 
prime example of the extremities of harm that can arise from misuing social media. 
Accordingly, if the requirement of intent remains, offenders of this kind whose purpose 
cannot be proven may not be deterred from engaging in such despicable behaviour and 
subsequently posting it online. 
 
Overall, although it may be unequivocally clear to viewers of content posted online that 
reasonable people would be offended by a particular communication, unless it can be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the communicator desired that another be harmed, 
they will not be subject to conviction under the provision.100 While appreciative that 
subjecting a person to a penal offence requires culpability, if the offence is to truly assist 
in deterring harmful content being posted online and to reduce the incidence of such 
behaviour, the current mens rea standard must either be rid of made consistent with the 
motives of all of those who communicate content which is obviously of a harmful or 
offensive nature. 
 
3 Recommendation as to what mens rea standard should be prescribed in the offence 
 
The current requirement of intent not only questions whether the purpose of deterrence 
is truly achievable, but the exclusion of any other mens rea state in the offence is unique 
when compared with other, arguably less culpable, offences in New Zealand which can be 
committed in the absence of a proven willingness to commit crime. 
 
In addition to intention, the two other mental states regularly prescribed in New Zealand 
law are recklessness and negligence. A person is reckless in law if that person does an act 
which creates an obvious and serious risk, and when that person does the act, they have 
either not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk, or has recognised 
that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it.101 Additionally, a 
person is criminally negligent where a reasonable person in the same circumstances would 
have been aware of the risks of doing the actus reus of an offence and would not have run 
those risks.102  
  
99  At [4] and [9]. 
100  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks, above n 47, at 2.3. 
101  R v Caldwell [1981] 1 All ER 986, 967 (HL); R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510, 527; [1981] 1 All ER 
974, 982 (HL). 
102  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks, above n 47, at 4.6.1. 
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As the Bill currently reads, the offence cannot be committed either recklessly nor 
negligently. This is very surprisingly given that other criminal offences which do not have 
the potential to cause the potentially irreparable harms that the Law Commission describes 
harmful digital communications as giving rise to. For example, current laws in New 
Zealand stipulate that people who behave offensively or disorderly in public or use 
language of that kind can be criminally liable if they do so recklessly.103 Furthermore, a 
person’s conduct can be criminalised if they publicly are in possession of an object which 
could possibly injure someone and recklessly does something with that object without 
reasonable excuse.104 Finally and perhaps most convincingly, if a person damages property 
or sets fire to vegetation recklessly they too can be subject to a criminal sanction.105 Simply 
put, if the Bill is enacted in its current format, New Zealand law will be in a position where 
somebody can potentially become a criminal for unintentionally setting fire to a plant, but 
people will not be subject to criminal liability, under this offence, for posting grossly 
offensive material which can, in the worst of cases, lead to self-harm and suicide, if they 
did not desire or contemplate that anyone be harmed or perhaps if the evidential difficulties 
of proving intent are not overcome. Such a result would seriously question the legitimacy 
of the New Zealand’s criminal offence arrangements and strongly suggests that the mens 
rea element of this offence should be either removed or lowered to a lesser standard of 
culpability. 
 
Given that the removal of the intent requirement and making the offence one of strict 
or perhaps even absolute liability would likely be considered too extreme, and that some 
culpability on part of the offender is obviously necessary, the introduction of a recklessness 
or a negligence standard may better achieve the object of deterrence. If the requirement of 
intent remains, then the offence does not account for situations where a person may post a 
communication which they know may harm someone, yet they post the content despite 
being aware of that risk. Additionally, those who are careless as to whether a 
communication will harm someone yet post that content where a reasonable person would 
not do so, are also immune from liability. Striking an appropriate middle-ground between 
a person needing to have wanted someone to be harmed and an offence where there is no 
moral blameworthiness on part of the defendant at all is undoubtedly necessary to deter 
harmful content being communicated and to set the right incentives for the users of 
cyberspace. Certain law and economics theorists advocate that criminalisation of 
  
103  Summary Offences Act 1981, s 4(1)(c)(i). 
104  s 13. 
105  s 11(2). 
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recklessness incentivises potential criminals to not engage in behaviour where there is a 
risk of harming someone.106 It ensures that where a person appreciates a risk of harm, they 
will act in a prudent manner to avoid that risk. Furthermore, criminalising negligence, albeit 
controversial, incentivises people to not act unreasonably.107 In the context of harmful 
digital communication the imposition of either a recklessness or negligence standard 
would, therefore, encourage those contemplating posting or communicating offensive or 
hurtful material to not do so. It would render claims from defendants that they were not 
aware that what they were posting would be harmful, ineffective.  
 
Overall, the imposition of a criminal negligence standard would likely be a step too far. 
Numerous academics have criticised doing so on the basis that it is excessively harsh to 
equate those who do wrong inadvertently to those who do so intentionally or recklessly.108 
Particularly, in a New Zealand context, manslaughter and sexual violation are the only 
notable serious criminal offences that criminalise with a negligence mens rea standard. 
Conversely, it could be argued that a person who negligently posts a harmful digital 
communication should be subject to the offence and the lesser culpability of a negligent 
offender is catered for during sentencing. However, even if a person’s sentence is alleviated 
they are still subjected to the stigma of being a criminal therefore this is unlikely to be 
considered satisfactory. Therefore, the mens rea standard in the criminal offence should be 
expanded to include recklessness for multiple reasons. Firstly, this would ensure our 
legislation accords with both the United Kingdom and Australia.109 Secondly, it would 
ensure that people who appreciate the risk of communications being harmful avoid posting 
them online where they can be disseminated and subjected to an exponentially growing 
audience. Finally, it would avoid the absurd result of not having a reckless standard in this 
offence, yet having one imposed for multiple crimes in the Summary Offences Act, the 
potential harms resulting from which are far less significant than those that can possibly 
result from harmful digital communications such as depression, self-harm and in the worst 
of cases, suicide. 
 
 
  
106  Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, above n 84, at 457. 
107  At 458. 
108  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks, above n 47, at 4.6.1; Hall “Negligent behaviour should be 
excluded from penal liability” (1963) 63 Columbia LR 632; Turner, “The mental element in crimes at 
common law” in Radzinowics and Turner (eds). 
109  Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 (19 July 2006). 
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IV Conclusion 
 
While the Harmful Digital Communications Bill does seek to make considerable 
inroads into the problem of cyberbullying by modernising existing legislation, introducing 
a civil enforcement regime and a new criminal offence, a critical analysis of the Bill’s 
current provisions, and a comparison with legislation abroad seriously questions the 
achievability of the Bill’s intended purposes. 
 
The Justice and Electoral Committee’s inclusion of the purpose of deterring harm is of 
particular significance when considered alongside the other amendments made during 
Select Committee revision. While the maxmimum penalty for the new criminal offence 
was significantly increased, little else was done by way of strengthing the Bill to achieve 
the object of deterrence.  
 
While the proposed criminal offence cannot be considered in isolation though, it is by 
far the most practical means of achieving deterrence. Civil law and tortious liability are not 
primarily concerned with deterrence, only compensation.110 Therefore, although the 
criminal offence is supplemented by the possibility of unique remedies such as takedowns 
of material, corrections of publications and giving the victim a right of reply, such orders 
do not seek to prevent society at large from engaging in the posting of harmful material 
online, only to set right the wrongs which misusers of digital communications have already 
caused. 
 
Accordingly, it is imperative that the new criminal offence is strengthened. By 
introducing a standard of recklessness as opposed to intent and removing the requirement 
that an intended victim must actually be harmed, this would provide the correct incentives 
for digital communication users and promote wariness when people are posting content 
online which may be regarded as objectionable. Furthermore, such reforms would ensure 
our legislation is in conformity with comparable legislation abroad and would proactively 
ensure internet users are not harmed in the first instance. Ultimately, while the 
Government’s inclusion of the intent and harm requirements in the legislation may be to 
ensure the Bill is not overintrusive on fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of 
expression,111 this may come at the unaffordable cost of seeing numerous innocent users 
of cyberspace being subjected to abuse while offenders escape criminal liability. Such a 
  
110  B Atkin, G McLay, and B Hodge Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 
4. 
111  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
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result would seriously question New Zealand’s commitment to making cyberspace a 
userfriendly forum, and ensuring that innocent internet users are free from the potentially 
irreprable harms that cyberabuse can bring rise to.  
Word count 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, footnotes, appendices and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 7886 words. 
  
27  
 
 
V Bibliography 
 
A Cases 
1 New Zealand 
R v Broekman [2012] NZCA 213. 
 
2 United Kingdom 
Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (QB). 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 (19 July 2006). 
R v Caldwell [1981] 1 All ER 986, 967 (HL). 
R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510, 527; [1981] 1 All ER 974, 982 (HL). 
Sweet v Parsley (UK) [1970] AC 132. 
B Legislation 
1 New Zealand 
Crimes Act 1961. 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (168-1). 
Harassment Act 1997. 
Privacy Act 1993. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Summary Offences Act 1991. 
 
2 Australia 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), s 474.17. 
 
3 United Kingdom 
Communications Act 2003 (UK). 
Criminal Justice Act 1982 (UK). 
Malicious Communications Act 1998 (UK). 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK). 
 
28  
 
4 United States 
ALA. CODE Sec.13A-11-8(b). 
KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. §525.080. 
 
C Books and Chapters in Books 
B Atkin, G McLay, and B Hodge Torts in New Zealand (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
 
A P Simester and W J Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2002). 
 
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (6th ed, Pearson, Boston, 2012). 
 
D Journal Articles 
 
Gehan Gunasekara and Alan Toy “MySpace” or “Public Space” [2008] 23 NZULR 191. 
 
Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 Dick. L. Rev. 
1 (1983-1984). 
 
Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation” (2004) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 173. 
 
Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyberbullying Respectful and 
Responsible Relationships: There’s No App for That (Nova Scotia, 29 February 2012). 
E Parliamentary and Government Materials 
1 New Zealand 
 
Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The adequacy of the current 
sanctions and remedies (NZLC 2012) at 11. 
 
29  
 
2 United Kingdom 
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications “Social Media and Criminal 
Offences Inquiry”. 
 
(14 June 2010) Column 316W Crispin Blunt MP (UK). 
 
F Internet Materials 
BBC News “Azhar Ahmed sentenced over Facebook solider deaths slur” (9 October 2013) 
<www.bbc.com>. 
 
BBC News “Facebook riot invitation lands Bangor man, 21, in jail” (23 August 2011) 
<www.bbc.co.uk>. 
 
Crown Prosecution Service “DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media 
prosecutions” The blog of the Crown Prosecution Service (20 September 2013) 
<www.blogs.cps.gov.uk>. 
 
Daily Mail Reporter “Builder ordered to pay policeman £400 after drawing two penises on 
a picture of him and posting it on Facebook” MailOnline <www.dailymail.co.uk>.  
 
Legal Dictionary by Farlex “Deterrence” <www.legal-dictionary.com>. 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures “Cyberbullying and the states” (9 July 2010) 
<www.ncsl.org>. 
 
Open Rights Group “Communications Act 2003/Section 127” 
<www.wiki.openrightsgroup.org>. 
 
Question More “UK Parliament shoots down ‘unnecessary’ anti-revenge porn laws” (29 
July 2014) <www.rt.com>. 
 
Stephen Wright, Liz Hull et al. “Detectives arrest man, 22, over ‘offensive’ Facebook page 
set up following deaths of shot policewomen” Mail Online (20 September 2012) 
<www.dailymail.co.uk>. 
 
 
30  
 
The Guardian “Facebook user avoids jail over April Jones comments” (7 November 2012) 
<www.theguardian.com>. 
 
The Huffington Post “Joshua Cryer, Newcastle Student Who Called Stan Collymore 
‘Coon’ In Racist Tweet, Spared Jail” <www.huffingtonpost.co.uk>. 
 
The IT Law Community “Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or 
Menace?” (9 October 2012) <www.scl.org>. 
 
WalesOnline “Man jailed for four months over Facebook attempt to start riots in Bangor” 
(23 August 2011) <www.walesonline.co.uk>. 
 
  
31  
 
VI Appendices 
 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (168-1). 
 
